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Modeling and Analyzing Academic Researcher Behavior 
 
Nguyen Huu Phuc* and Yoshiyuki Matsuura 
Graduate School of Innovation and Management of Technology, Yamaguchi University 
 
Abstract. This paper suggests a theoretical framework for analyzing the mechanism of the behavior of academic researchers whose 
interests are tangled and vary widely in academic factors (the intrinsic satisfaction in conducting research, the improvement in 
individual research ability, etc.) or non-academic factors (career rewards, financial rewards, etc.). Furthermore, each researcher also has 
his/her different academic stances in their preferences about academic freedom and academic entrepreneurship. Understanding the 
behavior of academic researchers will contribute to nurture young researchers, to improve the standard of research and education as well 
as to boost collaboration in academia-industry. In particular, as open innovation is increasingly in need of the involvement of 
university researchers, to establish a successful approach to entice researchers into enterprises’ research, companies must comprehend the 
behavior of university researchers who have multiple complex motivations. The paper explores academic researchers' behaviors through 
optimizing their utility functions, i.e. the satisfaction obtained by their research outputs. This paper characterizes these outputs as the 
results of researchers' 3C: Competence (the ability to implement the research), Commitment (the effort to do the research), and 
Contribution (finding meaning in the research). Most of the previous research utilized the empirical methods to study researcher's 
motivation. Without adopting economic theory into the analysis, the past literature could not offer a deeper understanding of 
researcher's behavior. Our contribution is important both conceptually and practically because it provides the first theoretical 
framework to study the mechanism of researcher's behavior. 
Keywords:  Academia-Industry, researcher behavior, ulrich model’s 3C. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, universities have dramatically 
accelerated its involvement in business and 
entrepreneurial activities. As a result, the 
assignment of  university has dramatically 
changed: it has become more and more 
entrepreneurial (Siegel et al., 2007). 
Universities not only have to provide 
education and research, but they also have to 
be involved in the commercialization of  their 
scientific results. University researchers, 
besides teaching and research, have come 
under increasing pressure to participate in the 
commercialization of  academic research. 
This is the problem of  balancing the academic 
freedom1 and academic entrepreneurship.  
                                                          
1 Academic freedom has two main components: freedom to conduct 
research (academic choice: the ability to choose one’s own research 
topics or choose their own research agendas), and freedom to 
communicate research (whether the scientist feels constraints in 
disclosing, communicating and sharing this research with others, i.e. 
the norms of open science) (Behrens and Gray, 2001). 
 
In contrast to researchers in the private 
sector, motivation of  academic researchers 
partly stems from the concept academic 
freedom. Accordingly, the intrinsic 
motivation of  academics, unlike researchers 
in industry, is to value independence in 
choosing their research agenda rather than 
monetary rewards. What happens if  
researcher job becomes more involved with 
the monetary factors? In some cases, the 
decision to collaborate with industry is 
influenced by perceived threats to a 
researchers academic freedom (Tartari & 
Breschi, 2012).  
 
Although the main concern of  academics is 
that industry involvement might restrict 
academic freedom, academics still express 
significant support for the collaboration with 
industry particularly when it is related to their 
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research (Lee, 1996). Moreover, empirical 
findings in Looy et al. (2004, 2006); Wash 
(2009) suggest that the engagement in 
entrepreneurial activities coincides with 
increased outputs of  research; activities in 
both do not hamper each other. Why does 
the academia-industry collaboration have 
such controversial effects on the behavior of  
academic researchers? Literature indicated 
that there are some certain types of  
researchers suitable for the collaboration.  
 
D’Este and Perkmann (2010) found that 
although researchers in the UK engage with 
industry to further their research rather than 
to commercialize their knowledge, they have 
different motivations to collaborate 
depending on the channels of  engagement. 
Lam (2010, 2011) found the similar results. 
Davis et al. (2009) also found that scientists 
oriented towards basic research, and 
scientists who had previously worked in 
industry, were concerned that university 
patenting would negatively affect both 
aspects of  academic freedom. Highly 
productive researchers, by contrast, were less 
apprehensive about either effect. The less 
productive basic researchers are especially 
worried about the effects on academics 
ability to choose their own research agendas. 
Scientists who had received research council 
grants, and full professors, are skeptical as 
regard to the effects on academic choice. 
 
This exploration of  researchers' motivation 
has attracted a growing interest in literature. 
Most of  these studies have been conducted 
through data surveys among universities and 
their researching staff, or direct interviews 
with academic researchers. Then, conclusions 
and insights concerning researcher's 
individual motivation were drawn by 
analyzing the collected facts. In short, the 
current analytical method is an empirical 
method. However, despite having numerous 
studies, still less is known about the 
interaction as well as the mechanism between 
the various internal factors of  the researchers 
(the intrinsic satisfaction, the improvement in 
research ability, the research effort, finding 
meaning in the research, career rewards, 
financial rewards, etc.) and their academic 
stances (preferences about academic freedom 
and academic entrepreneurship). The current 
analytical method has been challenged, and it 
needs to be complemented by a plausible 
theory. As far as we are aware of, this paper is 
the first to offer a theoretical framework to 
explore academic researchers' motivation 
within the context of  university-industry 
relationships and academic freedom. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
(Economics and Researcher 
Behavior) 
 
To build a model of  researcher behavior, the 
authors have evaluated several approaches. 
Among them, there are two popular 
thinkings in economics, that is, if  considering 
the researcher as a knowledge producer, we 
will adopt a kind of  production function of  
research into the model. This scheme will 
characterize the researcher as the one in 
industry. Alternatively, assuming that the 
researcher is a consumer who is enjoying his 
scientific outputs, we will construct utility 
function for the researcher. However, as 
shown by the following Table 1, due to the 
fundamental differences between university 
and industry researchers in the motivation of  
conducting scientific research, we adopted 
the utility approach in our paper. The 
intrinsic motivation of  academics, unlike 
researchers in industry, is to value 
independence in choosing their research 
agenda more highly than monetary rewards. 
 
Table 1.  
Academic entrepreneurial differences (Jain et al., 
2009) 
 Academic/Entrepreneurial  
Norms Universalism / Uniqueness  
 Communism / Private property 
Disinterestedness / Passion 
Skepticism / Optimism 
 
 
Processes Experimentation / Focus 
Long-term/Short-term 
Orientation 
Individualistic-Small 
group/Team management 
 
Outputs Papers / Products 
Peer recognition (or status) / 
Profits 
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2.1. Ulrich 3Cs 
Ulrich (2009) developed a concept called 3C 
(Competence, Commitment, Contribution) to 
manage and evaluate the performance of  
human resource. Competence is “the ability 
to do the work”. Competence means that 
individuals have the knowledge, skills and 
values required for today's and tomorrow's 
jobs. Commitment is “the effort to do the 
work”. Committed researchers work hard; 
put in their time. Contribution is “finding 
meaning (or intrinsic motivation 2 ) in their 
work”. 
 
According to this 3C thinking, to give the 
best performance of  a work, the man 1) not 
only has to possess an ability to do it such as 
skills or knowledge, 2) but also gives his best 
effort for the work (for example, working 
time), and 3) he must have an intrinsic 
motivation to do the work or finding 
meaning in the work he does. If  any one of  
these three Cs is missing, the other two will 
not replace it. Highly competent researchers 
who are not committed or are not 
contributing in conducting research will give 
low performance on research outputs. 
 
Dave Ulrich Model 3C  
= Competence x Commitment x 
Contribution 
 
2.2. Formation of  Utility Function 
1. Each academic researcher owns three 
resources:  
Competence ( 𝐶1 ), commitment ( 𝐶2 ), and 
contribution (𝐶3) defined as Ulrich's 3C - that 
are able to generate two types of  knowledge-
based outputs: academic output ( 𝑋 ) and 
commercial research output ( 𝑌 ). The 
concepts academic or commercial are just 
relatively characterized by their potentiality 
of  commercialization. They will be affected 
by various external factors surrounding the 
researcher. They will be determined 
according to the particular state of  the 
                                                          
2  Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) p.746: Human behavior is 
influenced by both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The former is 
activated from the outside. In particular, individuals follow the 
generalized law of demand. Intrinsic motivations, on the other hand, 
relate to activities one simply undertakes because one likes to do 
them or because the individual derives some satisfaction from doing 
his or her duty. 
researcher. Broadly speaking, one academic 
output resulted from a basic research 
originated by a researcher may be a 
commercial research output for others. 
 
In the regards to the number of  outputs that 
the researcher is able to generate, each of  the 
two knowledge-based outputs   and   should 
be also considered as one representative 
output for all producible academic and 
commercial outputs respectively. 
The assumed relations between 𝐶1,𝐶2,𝐶3, and 
𝑋, 𝑌 are described as follows: 
 Competence (𝐶1 ): the ability to do the work. 
We assume that the competence 𝐶1  of  a 
researcher comprises academic competence 
𝐶1𝑋  and profit-making competence 𝐶1𝑌 . 
Academic competence 𝐶1𝑋  is a kind of  
competence concerning the basic research 
ability. It is assumed to be indispensable for 
generating academic output 𝑋 . Similarly, 
profit-making competence 𝐶1𝑌  is 
indispensable for producing commercial 
output 𝑌. Practically, it is difficult to make a 
clear distinction between 𝐶1𝑋 and 𝐶1𝑌 . 
Since the competence 𝐶1𝑌  is generally 
cumulated through the development of  𝐶1𝑋 , 
we also assume that the competence 𝐶1𝑌 =
𝑔 (𝐶1𝑋(0) ) with 𝑔 as a concave function and 
𝐶1𝑋(0)  is the antecedent academic 
competence. 
 
 Commitment (𝐶2) : the effort to do the 
work.  
Here, there are two efforts in the respective 
to the outputs: 𝐶2𝑋 - the effort for academic 
research 𝑋 , and (𝐶2𝑌)  - the effort for 
commercial research 𝑌. 
 
The effort 𝐶2 can be interpreted as the time 
spent on the activities. The total time for 
working varies within the researcher's 
disposal working time 𝐶2̅̅ ̅.  
 
𝐶2𝑥 + 𝐶2𝑌 = 𝐶2̅̅ ̅   (1) 
 
 Generally, the limitation can be extended, for 
instance, when some part of  the work is 
outsourced i.e. the effort can be purchasable 
if  the researcher can access a fund. For the 
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researcher, a favourable joint project will 
occupy his minimal effort but still leaves a 
considerable budget for him to use in 
academic research (for example, buying 
outsource effort for his own academic 
research). It also offers him useful hints (for 
example, scientific research topic) for his 
academic research. 
 
Moreover, the competence 𝐶1, in general, will 
grow over time through the endeavour 𝐶2 of  
the researcher. As a result, when there is no 
supporting research fund, with 𝑓(∙)  as the 
voluntary training function, we describe the 
growth of  the competence 𝐶1 as follows: 
 
𝐶1𝑥 = 𝐶1𝑋(0) + 𝑓𝑋(𝐶2𝑋)  (2) 
𝐶1𝑌 = 𝑔(𝐶1𝑋(0)) + 𝑓𝑌(𝐶2𝑌)  (3) 
 
 Contribution ( 𝐶3 ): finding meaning (or 
intrinsic motivation) in the work we do. 
Obviously, researchers are happy to 
contribute his scientific work towards the 
society with or even without financial reward. 
For example, it may be for the prestige, or is 
to satisfy his intellectual curiosity personally 
as well as the desire for doing good socially. 
It may be simply because he likes to do it. It 
is natural to demonstrate this intrinsic 
motivation as an increasing function 𝜒(∙) of  
the value3 obtained from the research output 
𝑋 and 𝑌.  
𝐶3𝑋 = 𝜒(𝑋)      (4) 
𝐶3𝑌 = 𝜒(𝑌)            (5) 
It is logical to think that the intrinsic 
motivation 𝐶3 has a positive correlation with 
the respective effort 𝐶2 . As a result, when 
there is no supporting fund, with 𝜃(∙) as an 
increasing function, we can demonstrate 
them as follows: 
 
𝐶2𝑋 = 𝜃(𝐶3𝑋)       (6) 
𝐶2𝑌 = 𝜃(𝐶3𝑌)       (7) 
 
2. The more the researcher generates 𝑋 and 
𝑌 , the more he feels satisfied, that is, the 
higher his utility 4 𝑈 of  𝑋 and 𝑌 is. 
                                                          
3 For simplicity, we define the values of the research and as and 
respectively. 
4 We are aware that the economic concept of utility as generally 
applied today is outcome-oriented. As researcher's utility function is 
2.3. Mathematical Expression of  the 
Model 
 
2.3.1 Forms of  academia-industry relations 
There are various forms of  relations between 
academia-industry (Table 2) as well as several 
types of  research grants. As a result, the 
researcher is expected to adjust his behaviour 
to optimize his utility depending on the 
combination of  his collaboration forms and 
grant types. 
 
Table 2.  
Forms of  academia - industry relations (Link et al., 
2007; Perkmann et al., 2011) 
 
Licensing Contractual assignment of  
university-generated intellectual 
property 
 (such as patents) to external 
organizations 
Academic 
entrepreneurship 
Development & commercial 
exploitation of  technologies 
pursued by academic inventors 
through a company they (or 
partly) own 
Collaborative 
research 
Research jointly pursued by 
university and industrial 
partners commonly with public 
funding 
Contract 
research 
Application-oriented research 
and development activities 
carried out by university 
commissioned and funded by 
industry 
Consulting Application-oriented research 
and development activities or 
advice provided individually by 
academics commissioned and 
funded by industry 
  
2.3.2. Effects of  Research Grants 
Public and industry funds have different 
impacts on research output: (Bozeman and 
Gaughan 2007) indicated that grants and 
contracts from industry have a significant 
effect on academic researchers propensity to 
work with industry. In turn, public grants also 
have an impact in increasing work with 
industry, but a more moderate scale. Grimpe 
                                                                                      
actually a function of 𝐶3 - finding the meanings of doing an activity, 
it also implies that the individual simply undertakes that activity 
because he likes to do it, or because he derives some satisfaction 
from doing his activity. Indeed, it is preferences over actions which is 
critically different from preferences over outcomes (Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997; Frey et al., 2004). However, there are no problems in our 
paper owing to the fact that we define 𝐶3  as a function of the 
outcomes 𝑋 and 𝑌. 
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(2012) studied six types of  public and 
industry research grants in Germany and 
found that scientist productivity measured in 
terms of  publication and patent stock is a 
statistically significant determinant only for 
obtaining foundation and industry grants 
while the award of  an FP6 or government 
grant is influenced by other characteristics. 
Hottenrott and Thorwarth (2011) found 
some negative effects that a higher budget 
share from industry reduces publication 
output of  professors both in terms of  
quantity and quality in subsequent years. 
However, industry fund has a positive impact 
on the quality of  applied research if  
measured by patent citations. 
 
2.3.3. Integrating Industry Research Funds into the 
Model 
In this paper, since we are interested in the 
academic researcher's behaviour towards the 
collaboration of  academia-industry, public 
fund is temporarily excluded in the present 
setting. 
 
Industry gives the researcher a research grant 
to obtain his commercial research output 𝑌. 
Therefore, the grant amount is a function of  
the value of  𝑌, that is, 𝑀(𝑌). The researcher 
allocates the grant at will to increase his 
𝐶1𝑥, 𝐶1𝑌, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝐶2𝑌.  
 
The allocation amount is 
  𝑀1𝑥, 𝑀1𝑌, 𝑀2𝑋 , 𝑀2𝑌 respectively. 
 
The ultimate aim of  an academic researcher 
is to optimize his utility function. He will 
choose his optimizing targeting levels of  
competence 𝐶1 and effort 𝐶2by “purchasing” 
necessary amounts of  them. For instance, the 
researcher can hire other competent 
researchers, or outsource the tedious task of  
inputting data. 
 
The parameters 𝛼1𝑥, 𝛼1𝑌, 𝛽2𝑋 , 𝛽2𝑌 are the 
effect of  one money unit on 
𝐶1𝑥, 𝐶1𝑌, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝐶2𝑌 respectively. 
 
 max
𝐶1𝑋,𝐶1𝑌,𝐶2𝑋,𝐶3𝑋
𝑈 (
𝑋(𝐶1𝑋, 𝐶1𝑌, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝐶3𝑋),
𝑌(𝐶1𝑋 , 𝐶1𝑌, 𝐶2𝑌, 𝐶3𝑌)
) 
 
s.t. 
𝐶1𝑋 = 𝐶1𝑋(0) + 𝑓𝑥(𝐶2𝑋) + 𝛼1𝑋𝑀1𝑋 
𝐶1𝑌 = 𝑔(𝐶1𝑋(0)) + 𝑓𝑌(𝐶2𝑌) + 𝛼1𝑌𝑀1𝑌 
𝐶2𝑋 = 𝜃(𝐶3𝑋) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑀2𝑋 
𝐶2𝑌 = 𝜃(𝐶3𝑌) + 𝛽2𝑌𝑀2𝑌 
𝐶3𝑋 = 𝜒(𝑋) 
𝐶3𝑌 = 𝜒(𝑌) 
𝜃(𝐶3𝑋) + 𝜃(𝐶3𝑌) = 𝐶2̅̅ ̅ 
𝑀(𝑌) = 𝑀1𝑋 + 𝑀1𝑌 + 𝑀2𝑋 + 𝑀2𝑌 
 
3. Analysis Results and 
Implications 
  
For the simplicity, we will focus on two 
simple scenarios to examine our framework: 
1) there is no supporting research fund for 
the researcher, 2) there is a supporting public 
grant to use without any restriction.  
 
3.1. Case 1 
There is no supporting research fund for the 
researcher 
 
max
𝐶1𝑋,𝐶2𝑋
𝑈 (𝑋(𝐶1𝑋, 𝐶1𝑌, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝐶3𝑋)) 
 s.t.  
 𝐶1𝑋 = 𝐶1𝑋(0) + 𝑓𝑥(𝐶2𝑋) 
𝐶2𝑋 = 𝜃(𝐶3𝑋)  ≤  𝐶2̅̅ ̅ 
𝐶3𝑋 = 𝜒(𝑋) 
 
Since 𝑈(∙)  function, 𝑋(∙) function, 𝜃(∙) 
function and 𝜒(∙)  function are increasing 
functions with respect to their own variables, 
it is easy to see that the optimizing solutions 
are as follows: 
This is the simplest case. When there is no 
supporting fund, to optimize his utility, the 
researcher just conducts his work with all his 
effort. 
 
3.2. Case 2 
There is a supporting fund to use without 
any restriction. The fund amount is ?̅?  (a 
fixed value). 
 
max
𝐶1𝑋,𝐶2𝑋
𝑈 (𝑋(𝐶1𝑋, 𝐶1𝑌, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝐶3𝑋)) 
s.t. 
𝐶1𝑋 = 𝐶1𝑋(0) + 𝑓𝑥(𝐶2𝑋) + 𝛼1𝑋𝑀1𝑋 
𝐶2𝑋 = 𝜃(𝐶3𝑋) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑀2𝑋 
𝐶3𝑋 = 𝜒(𝑋) 
𝑀(𝑌) = 𝑀1𝑋 + 𝑀2𝑋 
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It is obvious that 𝜃(𝐶3𝑋)  will equal to its 
maximum value 𝐶2̅̅ ̅. Like in the previous case, 
it implies that to optimize his utility, the 
necessary condition is that the researcher will 
carry out his work with all his effort. 
However, since there exists a supporting fund, 
how should the fund be allotted to make full 
use of  it? 
 
The Lagrangian equation 𝐿(𝐶1𝑋, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝜆)  for 
this optimization problem is defined as 
 
𝐿(𝐶1𝑋, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝜆) = 𝑋(𝐶1𝑋, 𝐶2𝑋 , 𝐶3𝑋)
+ 𝜆 (?̅?
−
𝐶1𝑋 − (𝐶1𝑋(0) + 𝑓𝑋)
𝛼1𝑋
+
𝐶2𝑋 − 𝐶2̅̅ ̅
𝛽2𝑋
) 
 
The condition for optimization is as follows: 
 
𝜕𝑋 𝜕𝐶2𝑋⁄
𝜕𝑋 𝜕𝐶1𝑋⁄
=
𝛼1𝑋
𝛽2𝑋
−
𝜕𝑓𝑋
𝜕𝐶2𝑋
 
 
The left-hand side of  the above equation is 
the economic rate of  substitution between 
𝐶1𝑋 and 𝐶2𝑋. 
Alternatively, 
 
𝛼1𝑋
𝛽2𝑋
𝜕𝑋 𝜕𝐶1𝑋⁄
𝜕𝑋 𝜕𝐶2𝑋⁄
= 1 +
𝜕𝑓𝑋
𝜕𝐶2𝑋
𝜕𝑋 𝜕𝐶1𝑋⁄
𝜕𝑋 𝜕𝐶2𝑋⁄
 
 
Notice that 𝛼1𝑋
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝐶1𝑋
 and 𝛽2𝑋
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝐶2𝑋
 are the 
marginal research output of  money spent on 
𝐶1 and 𝐶2 respectively. 
In most of  cases, since 
𝜕𝑓𝑋
𝜕𝐶2𝑋
 is positive, it 
implies that at the state of  optimization, 
comparing with the money spent on research 
effort, money spent on research competence 
gives a higher value of  research output. 
𝑓𝑋(𝐶2𝑋)  is the voluntary training function 
that demonstrates the effect of  the effort 
𝐶2𝑋  accounting for substantial changes 
(usually, the increase) in the competence 𝐶1𝑋. 
 
Furthermore, making a comparative static 
analysis of  𝑀1𝑋(𝐶1𝑋, 𝑓𝑋) and 𝑀2𝑋(𝐶2𝑋), we 
found that if  
𝜕𝑓𝑋
𝜕𝐶2𝑋
 is low, researchers tend to 
increase money to “purchase” more research 
effort 𝐶2 . In contrast, more money will be 
allotted for “purchase” research competence 
𝐶1 if  
𝜕𝑓𝑋
𝜕𝐶2𝑋
 is high. 
 
4.     Conclusions and Discussion 
 
When there is no research fund provided, the 
researcher will conduct his work with all his 
effort to optimize his utility. However, if  
public fund is provided to facilitate the 
researcher’s work, he/she will tend to use the 
fund to improve his/her research 
competence rather than spend on research 
effort. In general, academic researchers will 
conduct both academic and commercial 
researches even without research fund on the 
condition that researchers are free to choose 
how to engage in commercial research. If  
commercial research is set as a compulsory 
task, both obtained utility and long-term 
academic output are lower than ones 
obtained when they are free. 
 
This study treats the concept of  human 
resource in a broader scope than a firm's own 
human resource at traditional intra-
organizational level. Open innovation 
increasingly plays an important role in R&D. 
In particular, escalating costs and shorter 
time in R&D are driving many firms to seek 
collaborations with academia to stimulate 
innovation. Companies are expected to not 
only organize their internal human resource 
efficiently, but also manage the "external" 
human resource smartly. In reality, despite 
amble opportunity to work together with 
academia, companies cannot capture the full 
potential of  such relationships. What caused 
the failure? As mentioned in this paper, 
perhaps that is about a distinctive difference 
in human resource working for companies 
and those for universities who, different from 
company engineers or researchers, have 
multiple complex motivations and instinct 
attributes that seem to be obscure to 
companies. Companies must have a different 
approach to manage and make use of  this 
kind of  external human resource in 
technology management. The first step is 
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that companies need to understand the 
academia researcher's behavior and his/her 
process of  decision-making. This paper has 
offered some theoretical insights for that first 
step. 
 
The results of  this research have shed light 
on difficulties and challenges for companies 
who want to make good use of  the external 
academia human resource. Some of  them are 
as follows. Firstly, companies must have an 
effective strategy to compete with public 
funds in enticing researchers into company 
research. Secondly, even with an ample 
commercial fund provided by companies, 
academia researchers tend to use it to 
improve their research competence rather 
than spend on the research itself. Companies 
therefore need an appropriate collaboration 
schedule to "oversee" the research 
performance, or they must find ways to 
integrate the improvement of  researcher 
competence into the project as a goal of  the 
collaboration. Thirdly, as academic 
researchers tend to prioritize their freedom in 
research, companies sometimes should not 
strictly "oversee" but smartly "follow up" on 
the project. Finally, as researcher's self-
interests might be too strong to manage in 
some cases, companies may need to think of  
building a network or a consortium of  
several universities that focus on a same 
specific topic. Creating such a cooperative 
competition (co-opetition) among academia 
researchers may reduce undesired effects in 
collaborating with just a few handful of  
academia researchers. 
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